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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

HOLISTIC RESILIENCE QUANTIFICATION FRAMEWORK OF
RURAL COMMUNITIES
Communities need to prepare for anticipated hazards, adapt to varying conditions,
and resist and recover rapidly from disturbances. Protecting the built environment from
natural and man-made hazards and understanding the impact of these hazards helps allocate
resources efficiently. Recently, an indicator-based and time-dependent approach was
developed for defining and measuring the functionality and disaster resilience continuously
at the community level. This computational method uses seven dimensions that find
qualitative characteristics and transforms them into quantitative measures. The proposed
framework is used to study the resilience of rural communities’ subject to severe flooding
events. Harlan County in the Appalachian region is chosen as a case study to evaluate the
proposed resilience quantification framework subject to severe flooding. The results show
the validity of the proposed approach as a decision-support mechanism to assess and
enhance the resilience of rural communities.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: INTERDEPENDENCIES AND THE LITERATURE
1.1 What is Community Resilience?
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan established by the United States
Homeland Security defines resilience as the ability to adapt to changing conditions and
withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies. Cimellaro et al. (2010)
define resilience as the capacity of engineering and socio-economic systems to recoil after
a severe disaster. McAllister (2016) defines resilience as “the concept that addresses the
way that communities prepare for and recover from disruptive events.” Baho et al. (2017)
express resilience as the period required for an ecosystem to reassemble to pre-disturbance
conditions. Cere et al., (2017) describe community resilience through the material property
application of elasticity. “Elastic” resilience signifies the idea of returning to the
preexisting equilibrium, which refers to the static concept of resilience. Consequently, the
“ductile” resilience interpretation is seen as a progression of continuous self-alteration and
modification that can be construed as bouncing forward, which refers to the dynamic
concept of resilience.
The resilience of a community or a system within the community is most often
compared to its performance. The manner at which the system absorbs the damage of the
impact and then recovers describes the performance, i.e., resilience (Ayyub, 2014). Figure
1.1 shows how a system’s performance is measured before, at, and after an impact. The
system’s performance is measured on the y-axis while the time is on the x-axis. The time
at which the incident occurs, is denoted as 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , the time at which the failure occurs is 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 , and

the time at which the system commences its recovery is labeled as 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 . ∆𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑 , ∆𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 , and ∆𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟

are the time durations of the disruption, failure, and recovery, respectively. Three failure
events are portrayed in the graph labeled as 𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 , 𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 , and 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 , meaning a
graceful failure, a ductile failure, and a brittle failure. Six different recovery patterns are

shown: 𝑟𝑟1, 𝑟𝑟2 , 𝑟𝑟3 , 𝑟𝑟4 , 𝑟𝑟5 , and 𝑟𝑟6 , signifying a better than new recovery, a good as new
recovery, a better than old recovery, a good as new recovery, a good as old recovery, and
a worse than old recovery, respectively. These different failure types and recovery patterns

give perspective into how differently and unique a community can react after the impact of
1

an incident. The initial and residual capacity and strength after the disturbance describes
its degree of robustness.

Figure 1. 1 Resilience through system performance (adapted from Ayyub, 2014).
The resilience of the community can be measured by the loss of resilience, meaning
the number of days it took for the community’s functionality to return to its original state.
This helps demonstrate which areas of the community are most vulnerable, therefore,
requiring more attention and funding allocation. Effective mitigation measures have been
a subject of research in the last decades and such improvements can be applied before or
after a disruptive event. Robustness is defined as "the strength, or the ability of elements,
systems, and other units of analysis to withstand a given level of stress or demand without
suffering degradation or loss of function" (Bruneau et al., 2003). There are many strategies
of mitigation measures that improve robustness of the built environment. One innovative
approach is using supplementary damping to structures. One innovative approach is using
vibration control devices installed in civil structures to improve the resilience towards
extreme natural hazards. Examples of these advance mitigating devices include base
isolation (Gutierrez Soto and Adeli, 2018), fluid viscous dampers (Gutierrez Soto and
2

Adeli, 2013a), tuned mass dampers (Gutierrez Soto and Adeli, 2013b), and semi-active
devices (Gutierrez Soto and Adeli, 2017; Gutierrez Soto and Adeli, 2019). Although these
advanced devices have been proven effective for protecting structures subjected to wind
and earthquake loading, this solution has not been widely adopted in the United States.
Recently, El-Khoury et al. (2018) investigated a risk-based life cycle cost approach to
achieve optimum design of structures that have vibration control devices installed.
Community resilience is characterized by the following terms: mitigation,
preparedness, functionality, recovery, and response. Mitigation and preparedness are two
different concepts related to community resilience that are important to distinguish.
Preparedness is the action taken to improve emergency response for the aftermath, while
mitigation is an action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to hazards (Baxter,
2013). Functionality is a factor that measures a structure’s recovery status and its capability
to remain serviceable (Baxter, 2013). Examples being hospitals delivering healthcare
promptly, and water distribution systems delivering potable water to a community
(McAllister, 2016).
FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, published a “how-to guide”
on the mitigation of potential terrorist attacks (Kennett et al. 2005). The objective of this
guide is to offer information on the proper steps necessary in assessing risk and then
applying the proper risk management plan to the community when under a threat of attack
(Kennett et al. 2005). The risk assessment process model can be seen in Figure 1.2. The
first step in the risk assessment process model is to gather a threat/hazards assessment,
where the threat is identified and measured, and an asset value assessment, identifying the
value of buildings that need to be protected. These two assessments compile the
vulnerability assessment addressing the community’s overall potential vulnerability. Next
the risk assessment is compiled allowing the identification of possible mitigation options.
Finally, the most appropriate mitigation strategies are then assembled into a risk
management plan for the community.
Present design codes and standards emphasize on the building’s lifecycle, and present
regulations address the dependability on the utilities’ functionality, however these
documents generally do not direct attention to the resilience or interdependency issues
(McAllister, 2016). It can be observed through the efforts of enhancing the seismic
3

resilience of communities (Bruneau et al., 2003) and the research performed on
community-driven disaster planning for long-term mitigation recovery plans (Chacko et
al., 2016) that a solution comprehending and satisfying the interdependent relationships
within a community is still not well-understood.

Figure 1. 2 Risk assessment process model (Adapted from: Kennett et al. 2005)
1.1.1 Interdependent Relationships
A reliable and quantitative methodology for economic risk-analysis modeling that
accounts community interdependencies is needed to properly predict direct and indirect
costs of destruction to properly prepare for a hazard event. The interdependencies such as
social, human health, safety and general welfare, physical systems, security, protection,
emergency response, business continuity, and buildings are critical in the search of
solutions to achieve community resilience and this has yet to be properly instituted in predecision modeling strategies (Cimellaro 2018). Shih et al. (2018) describe the building
blocks of a resilient community as one that contains solid connections amongst all points
of the community such as between neighbors, between neighborhoods and community
organizations, and between local government and nongovernmental groups. Cimellaro et
al. (2018) analyzed the role of interdependencies by investigating the resiliency of a
hospital. The authors developed a discrete event simulation model imitating the dynamic
operation of complex systems used to analyze the resilience of a hospital subjected to
4

earthquake loading. A hospital is defined as a departmental unit where an internal
interdependent organization along with the physical dimension at different levels is what
drives a successful operation on a day to day basis. The authors used the following
interdependent attributive parameters: the number of beds, the number of doctors, and the
operation efficiency. The predetermination of the resilience of a hospital during a natural
disaster can be vital in decision-making for future events and directly correlate into the
resilience assessment of a community. Cimellaro et al. (2014) proposed a resilience index
to evaluate the resilience of a region affected by a disaster considering infrastructure
interdependency using the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake in Japan as a case study. First, a
resilience index was given to every infrastructure in the region combined with others by
weighted factors. Then, the regional resilience index is calculated based on the weighted
factors of each infrastructure.
Murray-Tuite (2006) applied a man-made hazard event in the Washington DC area
of Reston, Virginia during a late evening and examined the transportation systems for
resilience with ten parameters: redundancy, diversity, efficiency, autonomous components,
strength, collaboration, adaptability, mobility, safety, and the ability to recover quickly. A
traffic assignment-simulation methodology was applied to the event and was examined
through different degrees of vulnerability based on government support, public attention,
and capacities such as adapting and coping. Koliou et al. (2018) investigated the resilience
of natural gas systems considering the interconnectivities between pipelines, port facilities,
fuel delivery, and airport and train operations.
Another approach to investigating interdependent relationships to achieve
resilience in a civilian community is examining resilience from the ecology perspective.
Baho et al. (2017) approached the intent for resilience from an ecological standpoint. The
environment in which organisms live in are not only affected by natural disasters, but also
by agriculture, land-use and climate change, species invasions, and infectious diseases. The
authors’ approach to ecological resilience is broken down into four parts: (1) scale, (2)
adaptive capacity, (3) thresholds, and (4) alternative regimes. The scale part considers the
amount of species having the same functional traits, the impact of disturbance dispersed
upon the ecosystem in study, and range of responses to disturbance, in order to grasp the
overall physical and psychological impact. The adaptive capacity part considers the
5

ecosystem’s response to environmental disturbance or changes. It takes into consideration
how differently rare species react to environmental change. The thresholds part considers
reorganization of an ecological community after a disturbance, and the alternative regimes
part covers the idea of an ecosystem adapting new roles in the surviving community. These
four attributes are used together to measure resistance, persistence, variability, and
recovery. By evaluating and calculating the numerous characteristics of resilience, the
general resilience assessment will move one step forward toward understanding the general
resilience of ecosystems and other complex systems.
1.1.2 Current Resilience Guides
The public’s understanding of community resilience is critical; and thus, providing
adequate resources are needed to improve resiliency. This has led to the development of
seven guides: (1.) the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Community
Resilience Planning Code, (2.) the San Francisco Bay Area Planning and Urban Research
(SPUR) Association Framework (3.) Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities
(BRIC) (4.) The Community and Regional Resilience Institute's (CARRI) Community
Resilience System (5.) The Oregon Resilience Plan (6.) the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Coastal Resilience Index, and (7.) The
Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit (CART). These resilience guides are
summarized in Table 1.1 and compared based off four parameters: (1.) the definition of
resilience stated in the respective guide, (2.) type of guide, (3.) the degree of community
interaction, and (4.) interdependent relationships addressed for within the guide for
successful community functionality. Although all seven are considered US resilience
guides, most of the material and messages are not stake-holder friendly thus claiming as
unsuitable for accessible public adoption. The Oregon Resilience Plan is a document
addressed to the public officials within Oregon, not the stakeholders who reside in the
community (OSSPAC, 2013). The guide was made to influence policy makers. The
Community and Regional Resilience Institute's Community Resilience System Report
however addresses the leadership team within a community and then implements
interactive workshops with the civilians. Within the community resilience system report,
all key interdependent relationships fell into similar categories of transportation, medical
facilities, emergency management services, water, and telecommunication services, except
6

for in CART. This was the only guide to address faith-based organizations (Pfefferbaum,
2011).
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides two guides for
community resilience: Mitigation Ideas: A Resource for Reducing Risk to Natural Hazards
(Baxter, 2013) and Are you Ready? An In-depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness (FEMA,
2004) provide step-by-step procedures for community members. The following guides
were not included in Table 1.1 because of their tended audience being local rather than on
a national scale. FEMA’s Mitigation Ideas: A Resource for Reducing Risk to Natural
Hazards is an informative document made to help communities identify natural
disasters/hazards and know the proper mitigation steps to take after. The guide addresses:
drought, earthquake, extreme temperatures, flood, tornado, tsunami, wildfire and multiple
hazards. For each disaster, recommended mitigation actions are summarized for the
purposes of local planning and regulations, structure and infrastructure projects, natural
systems protection, and education and awareness programs (Baxter, 2013). The Are you
Ready? An In-depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness brochure is intended to aid citizens in
learning the proper protection measures needed against all categories of hazards. The indepth guide teaches you to improve, train for, and have emergency plans that should be
done before, during, and after a disaster to protect people, property, and the community in
totality (FEMA, 2004).
1.2 Static Computational Models
Modeling community resilience through numerical simulations has attracted
research in recent years. Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2012) studied a time-dependent
assessment using a power transmission grid in Harris County, Texas with output given as
post-blackout improvement factors and different resilience strategies. The results showed
that when the post-blackout improvement factors were small, the resilience curves were
decreasing functions, and vice versa for large improvement factors. Nazari et al. (2013)
introduced a procedure in computing the probability of the collapse of a two-story wood
frame townhouse due to the aftershock of an earthquake.

7

Table 1. 1 US community resilience guides for natural disaster

Community Resilience Guides
Name
1. NIST
Community
Resilience
Planning
Code

Definition of
Resilience
The ability of a
community to
prepare for
anticipated hazards,
adapt to changing
conditions, and
withstand and
recover rapidly from
disruptions

Type of Guide
A six-step planning process for
local governments; 6-StepProcess: (1.) Form a
collaborative planning team. (2.)
Understand the situation, (3.)
Determine goals and objectives,
(4.) Plan development, (5.) Plan
preparation, review, and
approval, (6.) Plan
implementation and Maintenance

Interdependent Relationships
Healthcare facilities, schools, retail
districts, business facilities, (supply
chains, delivery networks, workforce
etc.) transportation network,
electricity, fuel, water, wastewater
systems, and
communication/information access;
energy systems

The SPUR framework
provides a 3-step process
for policy makers to take
into considerations for
future seismic design codes
for the San Francisco Bay
area.

Community planning, economic
development, good government,
housing, regional planning,
transportation; hospitals, police and
fire stations; medical provider offices,
airports for commercial traffic; public
shelters

8

The Degree of Community
Interaction
This guide allows provides
the community with
information how to properly
plan for community
resilience; a planning team
that provides leadership and
engages public, non-profit,
and private stakeholders,
are primarily who this guide
is intended to be read by

2. SPUR
Framework

SPUR defines San
Francisco’s “seismic
resilience” as its
ability to contain the
effects of
earthquakes when
they occur, carry out
recovery activities in
ways that minimize
social disruption,
and rebuild
following
earthquakes in ways
that mitigate the
effects of future
earthquakes.”

SPUR outlines seismic
performance goals and evaluates
then through this 3-step process
(1.) before the disaster (defining
resilience, the dilemma of
existing buildings, building it
right the first time, lifelines, safe
enough to stay) (2.) emergency
response (the culture of
preparedness, the hub concept)
(3.) after the disaster (rebuilding
our transportation infrastructure,
on solid ground)

8

Table 1.1 US community resilience guides for natural disaster (continued)

9

3. Baseline
Resilience
Indicators for
Communities
(BRIC)

"...resilience is as a
set of capacities that
can be fostered
through interventions
and policies, which in
turn help build and
enhance a
community’s ability
to respond and
recover from
disasters…”

BRIC provides a methodology and a set of
indicators to measure the present
conditions influencing disaster resilience
within communities

BRIC is a set of indicators
established for a community
to rate their own community
and better their
circumstances and chances
for their preparedness plans.

4. The
Community
and Regional
Resilience
Institute's
(CARRI)
Community
Resilience
System

"Resilience is the
ability to anticipate
risk, limit impact, and
bounce back rapidly
through survival,
adaptability,
evolution, and growth
in the face of
turbulent change.”

The Community Resilience System (CRS)
is composed of six stages, that build on
each other to help a community become
more resilient. In each stage, the
community is guided through a series of
actions. The first 3 stages are: Stage 1 –
Engage the Community at Large, Stage 2 –
Perform a Community Resilience
Assessment, Stage 3 – Develop a Shared
Community Vision

CARRI conducted monthly
interactive workshops to
provide information,
situational updates and
actionable insights, advice,
and support before, during,
and after disasters and
crises. The workshops were
free, featured nationally
recognized expert panels,
and were organized to
follow a PREDICT.PLAN.
PERFORM. A web-based
set of tools and resources to
make the process and
knowledge base is available
to a wide array of
communities.

9

BRIC uses a DROP, disaster
resilience of place “model to
establish indicators for a
community. Each set of
indicators are different per
community. The indicators
take the following into
considerations when
weighing in high to low:
ecological, social, economic,
infrastructure, institutional
capacity (mitigation),
community competence
Utility supply facilities; food
supply; private businesses;
economy, financial resources,
workforce, public safety,
energy, water, natural
environment, public health,
education, arts, entertainment,
and recreation, etc.

Table 1.1 US community resilience guides for natural disaster (continued)

10
10

5. The Oregon
Resilience Plan

“…preserving
our communities
and workforce to
help businesses
bounce back
quickly from a
natural
disaster…”

A guide for government officials to
evaluate their community based on a
set of questions (yes or no questions,
open response, etc.) aiming to
reduce risk and improving recovery
for the next Cascadia earthquake and
tsunami. This plan evaluates
Oregon’s buildings, lifelines, and
social systems, and proposes a plan
to develop a sustained program of
replacement, retrofit, and redesign to
make Oregon resilient.

Private investigation amongst
professionals in their areas provided
this plan as an informational resource
for policy makers to take into
consideration. Not a community
interactive guide. The three research
topics were: (1.) Determine the likely
impacts of an earthquake and
tsunami, and estimate the time
required to restore functions (2.)
Define acceptable timeframes to
restore functions an earthquake; and
(3.) Recommend changes in practice
and policies

Business and workforce
continuity, critical and
essential buildings,
transportation, energy,
information and
communications, water and
wastewater systems;
electricity, police and fire
stations

6. NOAA’s
Coastal Resilience
Index

“Resilience is
determined by
the degree to
which the
community is
capable of
organizing itself
to increase its
capacity for
learning from
past disasters.”

Method for community leaders to
perform a self-assessment of their
community’s resilience to coastal
hazards, identifying weaknesses a
community may want to address
prior to the next hazard event and
guiding community discussion. The
Index is not intended for comparison
between communities.

This report is intended for community
planners, natural resource managers,
or similar professionals who might be
involved with development of
community emergency plans for
coastal hazards and structural
development. This report is primarily
intended for positions representing a
city, a town, small groups of towns,
or a county.

Critical facilities and
infrastructure, transportation
issues, community plans and
agreements, mitigation
measures, business plans,
and social systems

10

Table 1.1 US community resilience guides for natural disaster (continued)
7. The
Communities
Advancing
Resilience
Toolkit (CART)

“Resilience can be
thought of as an attribute
(an ability or capacity), a
process, and/or an
outcome associated with
successful adaptation to,
and recovery from,
adversity.”

CART is a community intervention that
brings stakeholders together to address
community issues through assessment,
group processes, planning, and action.
The CART process is (1.) Generate a
Community Profile, (2.) Refine the
Profile, (3.) develop a Strategic Plan,
and (4.) Implement the Plan. It
addresses the need for interaction from
CART Team and partners, community
work groups, community planning
groups, and community leaders and
groups.

11

CART contains very interactive tools
designed to be used by the
stakeholder in a community. CART
Tools to be done but the community
members: (1.) CART assessment
survey, (2.) Key informant
interviews, (3.) data collection
framework, (4.) community
conversations, (5.) neighborhood
infrastructure maps, (6.) community
ecological maps (7.) stakeholder
analysis, (8.) SWOT analysis, (9.)
Capacity and Vulnerability
assessment

Infrastructure,
stakeholders,
ecology, social
service agencies,
economic
development
organizations,
business associations,
housing,
transportations,
libraries, faith-based
organizations,
education

References: (1.) NIST. (2015)."Community resilience planning guide for buildings and infrastructure systems"; (2.) SPUR.
(2009)."When is a building safe enough?"; (3.) CARRI. (2013). "Community and Regional Resilience Institute, Community Resilience
System"; (4.) Cutter (2014)."The geographies of community disaster resilience"; (5.) Oregon (2013)."The Oregon Resilience Plan:
Reducing risk and improving recovery for the next Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami"; (6.) NOAA. (2010). "Coastal resilience index:
A community self-assessment"; (7.) Pfefferbaum (2013). "The Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit (CART): An intervention
to build community resilience to disaster
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Using incremental dynamic analysis, fragility curves were created for the building
under four different intensity scenarios: mainshock-only, maximum considered earthquake
level mainshock-aftershock, design earthquake level main shock-aftershock, and a 0.8 g
level mainshock-aftershock. The results showed that the probability of structural failure
has no significant relation to the aftershock therefore deeming it as unnecessary to
implement aftershock design in performance based seismic design.
Francis and Bekera (2014) developed a resilience assessment framework consisting
of five components: (1.) system identification, (2.) vulnerability analysis, (3.) resilience
objective setting, (4.) stakeholder engagement, and (5.) resilience capacities. A case study
was performed on the fictional city of Micropolis evaluating the electric power
infrastructure resilience in Category 3 and Category 5 hurricane storm surge zones. The
underground electric power infrastructure east of the railroad, the infrastructure east of the
railroad in the commercial area only, and the infrastructure as-is in totality was assessed
through three different scenarios. The results indicated that undergrounding electric power
infrastructure east of the transmission line attained higher resilience and entropy resilience
scores.
Rather than evaluating the community as a whole, other frameworks assess the
individual buildings’ resilience that make up the community. Burton et al. (2015) proposed
a framework for computing each building’s damage measures that inform, repair, and
replace activities through hazard, damage, and structural analyses. From there, a new
decision variable is derived from the limit states describing the recovery of functionality at
the building level. Originally developed by the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research
Center at the University of California - Berkeley, Burton et al. (2015) applied the
performance-based earthquake engineering framework to model the post-earthquake
recovery of a community of residential houses. The collective occupancy loss over the
recovery period can be obtained from the recovery curve. This provides insight into the
long-term economic impact on the community. HAZUS, Hazards United States MultiHazard, and OpenQuake (Pagani et al. 2014) were used to simulate scenario earthquakes.
HAZUS is a software tool developed for the US Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) by the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) and is utilized as a
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standardized methodology for estimating physical, economic, and social impacts of
disasters using GIS technology (FEMA, 2003). OpenQuake is a web-based platform used
for the integrated assessment of earthquake risk developed by the Global Earthquake
Model Foundation. The hazard analysis in the framework was based on the ground motion
intensities in the study region location for multiple scenario earthquakes. The structural
performance was measured by story drift, residual story drift, and floor acceleration. The
damage analysis was determined based on the deficiencies for structural analysis
components. The building damage was then categorized into one of four 1.) safe and
operational, 2.) safe and usable during repair, 3.) safe but not repairable, or 4.) unsafe.
Individual house fragility curves were generated to enable the creation of a global
community fragility curve.
Guidotti et al. (2016) used the implementation of a six-step probabilistic method
for a critical infrastructure assessment on the virtual community of Centerville after the
impact of a 6.5 magnitude earthquake. The six steps are: (1.) generate a network model for
the system, (2.) generate the hazard for the network area, (3.) assess direct physical damage
to network components through fragility curves, (4.) define the network damage state
weighed through network dependencies, (5.) assess functionality loss (e.g. ability to
provide essential goods and services), and (6.) predict recovery time for network
functionality. The potable water distribution network system was evaluated separately and
then once again based on the cascading effects due to its dependency on the electric power
network. The probabilistic procedure includes models of damage, functionality, and
recovery. The results showed a higher standard deviation for the coupled water distribution
network and electric power network system than the water distribution network system
alone, reflecting a higher level of uncertainty. The recovery time also increased through
coupled networks.
Flint et al. (2016) approached a resolution towards community resilience during
multi-hazard disasters by optimizing building’s subsystems (i.e. soil, foundation, structure,
and envelope) while still in the early design stage. This holistic approach was focused on
the effects on mid-rise commercial buildings exposed to hurricane, earthquake, and
tsunami hazards. The framework consists of three modules: Module (1.) a soil, foundation,
structure, and envelope system generator, Module (2.) a multi-hazard performance
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assessment, and Module (3.) a set of multi-objective optimization algorithms that optimizes
repair and recovery strategies. Module 1 identifies Soil, Foundation, Structure and
Envelope (SFSE), systems that have the potential for optimal performance at a given site.
Module 2 assesses multi-hazard exposure, SFSE system performance before and after
hazard events, and life-cycle metrics associated with construction, operation, repair, and
recovery. Finally, Module 3 uses a multi-objective decision-making algorithm to
simultaneously optimize several conflicting objectives. Disregarding envelope systems, the
authors found 92 potentially viable SFSE systems compared to the 132 total systems.
Advancements in risk analysis assessments provide decision-making capabilities
for implementing disaster risk reduction plans. A probabilistic risk assessment is a
systematic and comprehensive methodology used to evaluate risks associated with a
complex engineered technological entity or the effects of stressors on the environment
(Salgado et al. 2016). Risk in this type of analysis measures the severity of the
consequences and the likelihood of occurrence. The total risk is calculated through the sum
of the products of consequences multiplied by the probability of the negative activities’
likelihoods of occurring. Salgado et al. (2016) developed a comprehensive approach to
probabilistic risk assessment to obtain physical risk indicators through damage and loss
events. This probabilistic risk assessment platform was used to perform a risk assessment
for the city of Medellin, Colombia using seismic hazard, exposure and socioeconomic
descriptors as predictive event data indicators. Bozza et al. (2017) modeled the city of
Sarno, Italy as a hybrid social–physical network and evaluated resilience using synthetic
and time-independent resilience measures during a seismic and landslide scenario.
Kammouh et al., (2018a) proposed a framework using distribution/density,
composition, and socio-economic indicators as input leading to an output of a resilience
function showing the serviceability of the community for a given period following the
disaster. Fragility curves are useful in quantifying the structural damage attained after an
event (Kammouh et al. 2018b). Alternatively, the restoration phase has also actively been
modeled for purposes of better understanding the structural performance. Kammouh et al.
(2018b) used the data from 32 earthquakes to plot restoration curves for four lifelines:
power, water, gas and telecommunication. These results calculated the downtime for each
lifeline and showed how the power system was always the first to recover with the
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telecommunications systems recovering second. Power systems were brought up quicker
and with shorter downtime since the other critical lifelines were dependent on power to
operate. Salman and Li (2018) proposed a framework that integrates a probabilistically
weighted deterministic hazard analysis model, the system performance level, a network
component measure and a life-cycle analysis using power networks located in Charleston,
SC and New York, NY. Nateghi (2018) proposed a resilience framework using data from
the impact of Hurricane Katrina on an electric power distribution system located in the
Central Gulf Coast Region. Resilience was modeled by hazard characteristics, system
topology and the area’s climate and topography using a multivariate tree boosting
algorithm. The results from the model predicted the number of outages, the number of
customers without power and the total cumulative outage durations.
1.3 Dynamic Computational Models
1.3.1

Game Theory

Game theory, first developed by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
(1928), has been used to study strategic and economic interactions in rational decision
makers. It is a discipline in mathematics that aims at modeling situations in which decisionmakers must choose specific actions that have mutual, and possibly conflicting,
consequences (Sun et al. 2017). The “use of game theory enables the modeling and analysis
of multiple players/decision makers. Each is involved in his own optimization problem but
with interactions with other decision-makers through objective functions and constraints.
This allows the modeler/analyst to capture the complexity and scale of humanitarian postdisaster operations in a more accurate and astute manner” (Nagurney et al. 2019).
Game theory has also been used to model poverty. Factors such as: income,
education, health, inequality, social exclusion, and security can explain the poverty
paradigm (Passino, 2016). The application of poverty models rationalizes the social
interdependency of a community. A poverty model is an influence diagram with
quantitative measures assigned by importance. In Figure 1.3, the poverty model is
specified. Wealth, health, and knowledge are the basis of what dictates the degree of
poverty for an individual or community.
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Figure 1.3 Poverty Model
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Wealth gives you the ability to adopt better health habits. Without good health, your
ability to go to school and gain more knowledge is impossible. Income positively dictates
your wealth, but expenses affect it negatively. The environment a person lives in and the
healthcare a person has affects their health, and the school and experience an individual
has impacts their degree of knowledge. By using this elaborate definition of poverty, a
solution for the greater good of a community when faced under a natural disaster can be
found.
Game theory can reveal new knowledge in optimizing decision-making schemes
for the players (e.g. buildings, community, government officials, and emergency
management team) involved. Chakravarty (2011) proposed using game theory to address
resource allocation between the government and multiple private and public companies
when faced with a disaster. Zhuang et al. (2012) applied game theory in preparedness
management in natural disasters. The players in this scenario are federal, local, and foreign
governments, private citizens, and adaptive adversaries. Their goal is to seek protection for
their lives, property, and critical infrastructure against man-made and natural disasters.
In 2005, the destruction impacted by Hurricane Katrina in the U.S., estimated from
between $100 billion to $125 billion (Nagurney, 2017). Disaster management is comprised
of decision makers’ tactics and direction from the government, private entities, and
nonproﬁt establishments, singling out game theory as an applicable practice to emphasize
(Seaberg et al., 2017). Game theory can be of two types: cooperative or non-cooperative.
The cooperative game theory calculates the gain of each player in a supportive-everyone
wins methodology while noncooperative game theory focuses on the specific moves'
players should rationally make to win individually. Every game is comprised of three
elements which are players, player actions, and payoff functions (Muhuri et al. 2017).
Rubas et al. (2008) studied a non-cooperative 3 player (USA, Canada, and
Australia) game to evaluate the economic linkage between a country using climate
forecasts or not. Vasquez et al. (2013) modeled a non-cooperative game for the usage of
project scheduling when prioritizing which actions should be taken first after a disaster
such as the 2011 Fukushima, Japan nuclear accident. Vahidnia et al. (2013) implemented
a geographic agent-based model to simulate agent interaction finding the best forms of

17

evacuation and relief when in the wake of a disaster. Chan (2015) simulated a game theory
inspired network for predicting mitigation strategies per disaster or attack.
Alvarez et al. (2019) used a cooperative game to model land use management for
flood retention as a useful tool for flood risk management. The game is situated around the
accordance of possible agreements among landowners and the establishment of cost /
beneﬁt criteria through land development agreements. Chen et al. (2016) investigate the
evolution of cooperation between individuals on a public goods game model that considers
a person's reputation as well as behavior diversity. Lai et al. (2015) applied game theory
for computing the combination weight of ﬂood risk.
When deciding the best evacuation plan after a natural disaster, the first step is
understanding the pedestrians’ movement. When in a state of disaster recovery, Peng et al.
(2014) revealed the practicality of concentrated rural settlement through the usage of game
theory. Muhuri et al. (2017) proposed a cooperative game theory-based methodology for
road traffic management in a disaster situation. The vehicles acted as players in the game
and each vehicle’s goal was to reach its destination by choosing the shortest travel time
path without disrupting the other vehicles’ paths. The payoff was calculated considering
its arrival time, priority and velocity. 200 random vehicles were evaluated as players in a
disaster area consisting of six road blockages.
Bouzat and Kuperman (2014) use Prisoner’s Dilemma game theory approach for
optimizing the best pedestrian room evacuation routes. The two by two symmetric games
were used where the players, the pedestrians, have access to the same set of strategies and
payoffs. Eid et al. (2015) thrive to find an optimum balance between post-disaster
insurance plans bought by resident families, retailed by insurance companies, and postdisaster relief executed by a government agency by using the evolutionary stable strategy.
The resident families acted as the main controller of the game’s environment, and the
insurance companies and the government operated as supportive players for analysis.
Attacker-defender games model several players defending a resource or territory
and a number of attackers attempting to destroy or capture that defended resource or
territory (Sims, 2016). Many times, these games are represented through payoff matrices
or decision trees. Hamilton and McCain (2009) used an attacker-defender game for the
development of defense strategies when a community is being threatened with a smallpox
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attack. Hausken et al. (2009) introduced a two-player, attacker-defender game to study the
trade-offs among financing in protection from natural disasters or man-made attacks. In
this circumstance, the defender is finding a solution on how to properly allocate
investments based off different defense mechanisms by investing in defense against either
a natural disaster, terrorism, or both. Ferdowsi (2017) implemented a zero-sum
noncooperative game consisting of an attacker who seeks to alter the conditions of the gaspower-water critical infrastructure to upsurge the power generation fee and a defender who
distributes communication resources to local areas to oversee the infrastructure. Although
Ferdowsi (2017) used this application for the case of a manmade disaster, it can also be
directly correlated to the community’s lifeline dependencies during a natural disaster.
Haphuriwat and Bier (2011) used an attacker-defender game theory model to
embody the resource distribution problem during natural disasters for emergency response
management. Horiuchi (2012) presented a modified Hawk-Dove game (Maynard-Smith,
1982) for showing the situation during and after a disaster where people assemble groups
to support each other through the recovery stage of disaster management. In a Hawk-Dove
game, when speaking in terms of resources, the best payoff results from two doves sharing
the resources equally, but in this scenario a Dove-Hawk-Bourgeois game is being played,
where the doves are in competition for the resources. Although using a static model rather
than a dynamic, Lei (2008) structured a risk probability analysis model to cultivate a
decision analysis prototype for the alleviation of numerous different disasters through the
applications of game theory.
Ergun et al. (2014) used a cooperative game of telecommunications optimization
for maximizing supply chain effectiveness when in response to a disaster. Nagurney et al.
(2019) introduced an integrated financial and logistical game theory model for
humanitarian organizations or non-governmental organizations. In the occurrence of a
natural disaster, an influx of resources is sent to the affected area. More than half of the
items that arrive at a disaster site are nonpriority items. Victims are then suffering more
because they do not receive the critical needed supplies in a timely manner due to the
disorganization of dealing with the nonpriority supplies. Noncooperative games were
played with the relief item movements and the utilities of the non-governmental
organizations and then applied to the situation through game theoretic algorithms.
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Coles and Zhuang (2011) introduced a method to provide and aid decision makers
in emergency surroundings on how to choose and sustain relationships to advance resource
utilization in a disaster. Mulyono (2015) used game theory to model a community’s
effectiveness in establishing resilient energy production, distribution, and consumption
when impacted by a disaster. Zhuang and Bier (2007) investigated resource allocation
stabilization for the protection of natural disasters. The attacker-defender game model used
was both consecutive and instantaneous with the attacker having an incessant degree of
effort. Smyrnakis and Leslie (2010) use a stochastic ﬁctitious play model to determine the
proper steps to take in the response phase of disaster management. For more global issues,
namely global climate change, Vasconcelos et al. (2015) modeled the effectiveness of a
multi-centered architecture of several minor scale agreements through the application of
the evolutionary game theory of polycentric governance.
Table 1.2 displays the summary of the literature review on recent research that
studied game theory during a natural or manmade hazard scenario.
1.3.2

Agent-based modeling

Efforts to model resilience through game theory applications are still relatively
new. Eid and El-adaway (2018) used an agent-based model for post disaster recovery
simulations to address how the primary fixation in achieving sustainable disaster recovery
lies in two ideas: 1.) integration of stakeholders into the recovery decision-making
processes, and 2.) impact of redevelopment, economically, environmentally, and socially
speaking, on the host communities’ vulnerabilities to hazard events. The five-step research
methodology implemented social, economic, and environmental vulnerability assessments,
and used residents, the economic sector, insurance companies, and government agencies
as the four interacting agents in the agent-based model. The holistic approach was applied
to three Mississippi coastal counties during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The results
categorized the regions by vulnerability with each region of the three counties being
measured from least vulnerable to above average vulnerability for the environmental
vulnerability assessment enabling an overall sustainability plan to be put into place for each
county.
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Table 1. 2 Game theory studies in natural and manmade hazards

Game Theory
Author(s)
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Game Type

No. of
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3
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Security
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Disaster Risk
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Management
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natural
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Money
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Security
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budget
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community

Security

disaster relief

disaster

resources
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In attempting to model community resilience, four different forms are commonly
known among researchers: technical (i.e. capability to function and perform), organization
(i.e. organization’s aptitude to manage the system), social (i.e. society’s effort in dealing
with the services’ deficiencies), and economical (i.e. the competence to decrease both
indirect and direct economic costs) (Cimellaro et al. 2016). As previously mentioned,
Bruneau et al. (2003) describe four resilience attributes: robustness, redundancy,
resourcefulness, and rapidity. The PEOPLES framework is an example of a framework that
incorporates all four types of resilience and the four attributes approaching the concept of
a multiagent system (Cimellaro et al. 2016). PEOPLES is beneficial for the influence of
decision makers when under emergency situations due to its ability to identify different
resilience aspects of a community split into seven dimensions. Within each dimension, lies
a number of indicators with quantitative indices available for the user’s input. At last, the
performance functions of each dimension are aggregated into a single serviceability
function that embodies the performance of the community after natural disasters. The
framework consists of a simulations-based approach and an indicator-based approach
(Cimellaro et al. 2016).
Each approach applies an extreme event scenario to the community and performs a
fragility analysis. The performance metrics of losses, restoration time, performance index,
and resilience index are compared amongst the other layers. This framework was applied
to the city of San Francisco after the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake (Kammouh et al. 2019).
The physical infrastructure dimension was the only dimension of the resilience framework
evaluated in this scenario. The results showed a need for better resilience in facilities
compared to lifelines.
There is potential for modifying this approach by integrating other game-theory
concepts in the sociotechnical network and the impact on community resilience. The BDI,
beliefs-desires-intentions, agent model developed by Zoumpoulaki et al., (2010) is
integrated into the different dimensions and components for defining the interdependencies
in the PEOPLES framework. Schut and Wooldridge (2000) and Zhang and Hill (2000)
have previously implemented BDI intelligent agents into their work, but this specific BDI
design incorporates the Five Factor Model (Costa and McCrae, 1992), OCEAN, which
includes five personality traits, Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness
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and Neuroticism. The multiagent BDI architecture is very similar to a simple reflex agent,
but the BDI perception relies heavily on the agent’s emotional and personality states. The
perception phase is first and begins with the agent obtaining new information based off its
surroundings through sensors. As the perception is informed, the agent’s previously stated
beliefs are updated then are run through an appraisal process. The emotional state gets
updated based off its new beliefs and then a desire is generated based off its weighted
personality and emotion vectors. The appropriate OCEAN personality traits are then
assigned to each agent, and then all actions are formed to replicate human actions during
an emergency situation.
1.4 Flood Resilience
Many community resilience frameworks have been investigated for natural
disasters, primarily earthquakes, but flooding caution should be emphasized. Climate
change and human influences perturb stream flow and the sediment distribution in river
systems (Sofia et al. 2020). Flooding not only causes sediment deposition, but also erodes
embankments and alters fluvial geomorphic properties (Sofia et al. 2020). Periodic minor
flooding impedes human livelihood and creates a less predictable living environment (Sung
et al. 2018). Prevalent and more perilous flooding is anticipated due to the effect of extreme
climate change and sea level rise. Also, as the temperature rise of oceans continue to occur,
intense storm activity is predicted (English et al. 2017), which puts communities in severe
risk.
In order to mitigate against flood damage, the National Flood Insurance Program
suggests elevating the house, but this action makes the house more vulnerable to larger
wind exposure. It is difficult to reduce vulnerability from wind and flood damage
concurrently because mitigating solutions may contradict each other. One alternative
solution can be amphibious construction in coastal regions to help mitigate hurricane
damage from flood and wind damage (English et al., 2017). An amphibious structure relies
on buoyancy to offer momentary flotation (i.e. floating docks) and vertical guidance to
prevent lateral movement. The first commonly known approach to flood management has
been to examine the structural deficiencies of hydraulic systems such as levees or dams
and then construct newer and better ones (Sung et al. 2018). This strategy implemented in
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order to achieve stability and predictably towards flooding, in reality, increases the area’s
fragility to rare floods in the long run.
Various studies have taken an understanding to the levee effect and have reexamined flood management through different options rather than structurally (Montz and
Tobin, 2008). The levee effect suggests that intermittent and calamitous disasters are the
result of over dependability of structural engineering solutions (Di Baldassarre et al. 2015).
Miguez et al. (2019) investigated urban flood control through a systematic approach in
finding the optimal design for the Dona Eugenia watershed of the metropolitan area of Rio
de Janiero, Brazil. MODCEL, a hydrodynamic model, was used for flood mapping 50year design alternatives. An index was used to evaluate the flood risk through variables
such as socioeconomic dependencies. A flood resilience index was used to assess the
resilience through the assessment of its future response to a flood greater with which its
design was designed for. Finally, the economic feasibility is determined through depth
damage curves for residential housing and project design and construction costs. The
results showed that the originally believed most sustainable option regarding flood control
was of the river restoration approach was not the best economically feasible choice. The
economic factor was too high due to the low-income demographic of the residents in the
area. Results showed that the river restoration required the adaption of homes and these
changes would be detrimental rather than beneficial for the community.
Falter et al. (2016) estimated flood losses for the German part of Elbe catchment
by applying a process-based model cascade with the usage of a rainfall-runoff model, a 1D
channel routing model, a 2D hinterland inundation model, and a flood loss estimation
model. This four-part procedure known as the regional flood model, RFM, was
continuously performed over the period of 1990-2003, 14 years. RFM showed a large range
of uncertainties within the data. Three floods occurred during the simulation period
enabling a large percent in error in the 1D hydraulic model set-up. Sung et al. (2018)
implemented a conceptual model of human-flood interaction facilitated by flood control
strategies considering instabilities in the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta in southwest
Bangladesh. Taking seasonal water level fluctuations and rising land-sea level difference
into account in the model community’s flood protection system, the results showed that
adaptive forms of flood control strategies outperformed nonadaptive ones.
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1.5 Urban Resilience vs. Rural Resilience
When distinguishing rural communities vs. urban communities, a prioritization to
urban areas during a state of emergency is more prevalent than in rural areas. Between the
years 2010 and 2016, a tremendous drop in rural population has occurred along with higher
poverty and unemployment rates (USDA, 2017). Tierney (2013) describes rural
communities as “under resourced places in which the capacity to anticipate, cope, and adapt
has been seriously compromised.”
Mukherjee et al. (2017) investigated resilience in rural India using the key
predictors of severe weather-induced sustained power outages. The authors found that there
was a lack of attention from utility companies in terms of hardening the electric
infrastructure or investing in operation and maintenance in rural areas. Compared to urban
areas, less priority is given to rural areas in terms of disaster recovery efforts which
inevitably leads to longer recovery periods for rural communities (Mukherjee et al. 2017).
Communities with a large percent of commercial electricity consumption are communities
with a huge percent of commercial enterprises such as shopping centers, grocery stores,
and social facilities. Urban areas are where most of these facilities are built in. Since such
commercial facilities’ main objective is to be aesthetically pleasing to the public for more
clientele, there is a huge urge for fast recovery. Since rural communities contain less of
these commercially owned facilities and the land is more of personal usage, the recovery
period will be entailed longer (Mukherjee et al., 2017).
When applying for grants and financial resources, urban communities have superior
prerogative due to a larger vulnerable population and more prominent infrastructure at hand
(Caruson and MacManus, 2011). With federal support being scarce for rural areas,
investing in community resilience becomes an even more challenging goal (Aldrich and
Meyer, 2015). With the infrastructure of rural communities lacking quality and proper
zoning and building enforcements (Schwab, 2016), being impacted by a natural or
manmade disaster encourages the local government to attempt to increase resilience
through stricter or newer building codes. These new changes make it difficult for former
residents to afford property with the new improved standards causing gentrification to
ensue (Ganapati et al. 2013).
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Although more people make up urban communities, rural communities have a
better sense of social capital (Jerolleman, 2020). Cutter et al., (2016) used a resilience index
BRIC, Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities, to investigate the impact of rural
characteristics on a community's resilience. The authors’ findings reported that rural
communities had a strong social capital, social connectivity amongst the community,
allowing a better communitive response to unexpected events. For example, in 2005 during
the aftermath of the destruction Hurricane Katrina produced, rural Louisiana boat owners
hurried to New Orleans to help rescue those trapped on top of residential roofs (Jerolleman,
2020). Another example was during the 2011 Virginia Tornado where local churches
sheltered and provided goods, neighboring families assisted each other with clearing
debris, and outside regional people came to offer aid causing the residents to only need to
stay at the shelter for two days (LaLone, 2012).
Although the social capital element helps with disaster recovery, better hazard
mitigation planning needs to be accounted for. Inadequate resources, more isolated towns,
insufficient experts or consultants in the disaster mitigation field, and poor housing stock
all disable proper community planning (Horney et al. 2017). Recovery committees do not
have enough people or personnel to fill it, therefore leaving the community in danger.
Disaster prevention should be seen as a public good (Jerolleman 2020). Mining-related
incidents and other environmental and technological disasters have been focused on being
prevented by the local governments of rural communities, but more frequently occurring
natural disasters such as flooding, should be better invested in instead (Scott et al. 2012).
Within the Appalachian Region of the United States, flooding has either been the cause or
destroyed projects to better the region such as during the constructions of the Racine, Ohio
water treatment plant and storage in 2004, the Water Valley, Mississippi sewer in 2007,
and the waste water treatment solutions for West Virginia’s coal region in 2010
(Appalachian Regional Commission, 2013).
The Appalachian Region is a 205,000 square-mile region in the US composed of
420 counties whose economies relied heavily on mining and coal exploration. When those
industries were no longer needed in those areas, a high poverty rate spiked resulting to over
30% in 1960. Today most of these areas are still recovering and are 42% rural (Appalachian
Regional Commission). Kentucky is one of the 13 states a part of the Appalachian Region.
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38 out of 120 counties are a part of Appalachian Kentucky. Due to its recovering economy,
resources and government funds are still minimal therefore when approached by a natural
hazard, it could have severe consequences. As prevalent as floods are, by using a disaster
pre-decision tool to estimate losses local officials and politicians can form more efficient
emergency preparation plans and prioritize community investments.
With flooding in rural communities being a prominent dilemma yet to be solved, a
pre-decision framework may be the best solution. A modified PEOPLES framework is
proposed in this research to study the resilience of rural communities’ subject to severe
flooding events. Harlan County in the Appalachian region is chosen as the case study. In
order to gather data that can be used as input, a scenario flood will be applied to Harlan
County through the FEMA HAZUS flood model. The flood investigated will be set in
February, reflecting the February 2018 flood that caused immense damage to the county
(Marie, 2019).
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CHAPTER 2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.1 Problem Synopsis
In 2015, three United Nations global policies were implemented: 1.) the Sendai
Framework, 2.) The Sustainable Development Goals, and 3.) The Paris Agreement on
Climate Change. In March 2015, 187 United Nations member states agreed on the
adoption of the Sendai Framework (2015-2030). The Sendai Framework was developed in
Sendai, Japan and aims at merging current and past community resilience research to
reduce the number of lives lost in natural and manmade hazards each year globally (AitsiSelmi et al. 2016). The Sendai Framework emphasizes the need to “enhance the scientific
and technical work on disaster risk reduction and its mobilization through the coordination
of existing networks and scientific research institutions at all levels and in all regions, with
the support of the United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction Scientific and
Technical Advisory Group (UNISDR 2015).”
Natural hazards continue to pose a challenge to the built environment and
understanding the impact of these hazards in a community is a complex problem. Hazards
are geographically dependent. Rural Kentucky most common hazard are flood events.
Although the fatality rate is higher for earthquake events, prolonged property damage is
significant during flood events. Furthermore, with federal support being scarce for rural
areas, investing in community resilience becomes a difficult challenge. Predicting the
potential losses of one natural hazard can support in understanding the effects of critical
decisions in allocating limited resources.
Within the state of Kentucky, many floods have occurred, causing flood resilience
to be incredibly prevalent even today. For the reason that the need for resilient
infrastructure is vital for society, this research focuses on a holistic approach to quantify
the resilience of Rural Appalachia. This research studies a renowned resilience framework,
PEOPLES, to Harlan County, Kentucky, after a major flood event. The flood investigated
is set in February, reflecting the February 2018 flood that caused $24,726,412 worth of
damage to Southeastern Kentucky (FEMA-4361-DR). The novelty of this research is
threefold: (a.) an accessible indicator-based PEOPLES approach is used as opposed to the
traditional simulation-based approach, (b.) the aim of this study is focused on rural
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communities as opposed to the prevalent resilience frameworks for urban communities,
and (c.) a unified way of addressing the effects of multiple hazards.
2.2 Methodology: PEOPLES
PEOPLES is an indicator-based framework that identifies different resilience
aspects of a community split into seven dimensions. The dimensions are: 1.) population
and demographics, 2.) environmental and ecosystem, 3.) organized governmental services,
4.) physical infrastructure, 5.) lifestyle and community competence, 6.) economic
development, and 7.) social-cultural capital. Within each of the seven dimensions,
qualitative measures are interpreted into quantitative measures. This methodology
combines technical and non-technical characteristics and incorporates the interdependent
relationships within a community into the overall resilience index. An interdependency
matrix technique applies levels of importance to different components based on
functionality dependability. This framework provides decision-makers the opportunity to
quantify the long-term benefits and evaluate preliminary decisions towards strategic
planning for a rural community development. A closer step towards flood resilience allows
communities to penetrate the deficiencies within their community to be able to take the
preparations to improve their resilience towards natural disasters. Frameworks that
quantify the resilience of Rural Appalachia can open the door for evaluating resilience of
rural communities worldwide subjected to multiple hazards.
Bruneau et al. (2003) describe four resilience attributes (four R’s): robustness,
redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity. The PEOPLES framework incorporates all four
attributes of resilience, allowing a holistic resilience quantification approach aiding
decision makers before, during, and after emergency situations. PEOPLES incorporates the
four forms of resilience among researchers through the following performance measures:
technical (i.e. capability to function and perform), organization (i.e. organization’s aptitude
to manage the system), social (i.e. society’s effort in dealing with the services’
deficiencies), and economical (i.e. the competence to decrease both indirect and direct
economic costs) (Cimellaro et al. 2016).
The technical, organizational, social, and economic performance measures within
a community can be identified by the integration of the four R’s (Bruneau et al. 2003).
Robustness is seen technically as the degree of avoidance in damage, organizationally as
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the ability to continue community essential functions, socially as casualty avoidance and
disorder in the community, and economically as avoidance of direct and indirect losses
(Bruneau et al. 2003). Redundancy is measured technically by the extent of backup plans
and extra supplies available, organizationally as the number of alternative shelters and
relocation sites accessible, socially as the amount of community needs options, and
economically as the additional number of inventories and suppliers (Bruneau et al. 2003).
Resourcefulness is assessed technically as the amount of damage detection methodologies
present, organizationally as the number of plans and amount of resources put in place in
order to manage the damage and disturbance, socially as the amount of resources for
community needs options, and economically as the capacity to recovery financially from
an unexpected impact (Bruneau et al. 2003). Finally, the level of rapidity is defined
technically through the recovery-period necessary for the entire community to return to its
original state, organizationally by the minimal time necessary for key services to be
restored, socially by the average recovery time needed for societal levels to return as before,
and economically by the average recovery-period needed for the economy to return to its
original, functioning state (Bruneau et al. 2003).
Figure 2.1 shows the seven dimensions from the PEOPLES framework, each
dimension overlapped with the map overlay of Harlan County, KY. Harlan County is
located in Southeastern Kentucky, and it is an area with intersecting attributes important to
take into consideration when studying resilience against natural hazards in totality. The
PEOPLES framework can be used through two approaches: 1.) Simulation-Oriented
Approach, or 2.) Indicator-Oriented Approach (Cimellaro et al. 2016).
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Figure 2. 1 PEOPLES seven dimensions for Harlan County
The simulation-oriented approach methodology is visually justified in Figure 2.2.
First, the community is assessed through the four R’s of resilience, robustness,
resourcefulness, redundancy, and rapidity (Bruneau et al. 2003) to establish the pre-event
conditions. Then, a scenario disaster is applied to the community under investigation. The
hazard damage data is then analyzed through the combined framework organizing physical
lifelines (i.e. power and water) into network models and the non-physical lifelines (i.e.
emergency medical professionals and the fire unit) into agent-based models. The
PEOPLES framework adapted a Beliefs-Desires-Intentions (BDI) agent-based model
developed by Zoumpoulaki et al. (2010) to simulate the non-physical lifelines (e.g., the
emergency management team and fire brigade response during the hazard event). Then,
that data is organized into the seven dimensions, 𝛽𝛽1…7, and used to create a community
resilience index. Next if the community resilience index insufficiently characterizes the
community, the index is reexamined through “Breaks and Importance Identification” and

“Supply and Opportunity Assessment” identifying any missed features about the specific
community needed to satisfy the simulation. Finally, the community is evaluated through
the four R’s again and newer built performance measures produce another community
resilience index.
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Although the simulation-oriented approach uses newer agent technology, the
indicator-oriented approach offers a more accessible solution for local government officials
within rural communities. This tool provides decision makers with quick and easy solutions
for preliminary decisions in comparison to the simulation-oriented approach which is more
time consuming and expensive to run (Cimellaro et al. 2016). With the indicator-oriented
approach, there are many more options in data attainment as with the simulation-oriented
approach, the simulation is assumed to already have permanent data. Using the indicatororiented approach allows various simulations to be run, allowing the community to be
studied as a dynamic relationship and data to be continuously modified. The proposed
modified framework is a unified approach to quantify resilience of rural communities
This approach evaluates the scenario hazard on the community through a layered
framework based off the dimensions: population and demographics, environmental and
ecosystem, organized governmental services, physical infrastructure, lifestyle and
community competence, economic development, and social and cultural capital. Within
each of the seven dimensions, lies multiple components with a characteristic associated
with the theme of the specified dimension, and within each component lies various
indicators which take the qualitative measures and interpret them as quantitative measures.
The hierarchical relationship is shown in Figure 2.3. The variables D, C, I, and M
represent the dimension, component, indicator, and measure, respectively, with the
subscript 1, 2, through 𝑖𝑖 to denote each group sequentially. Each measure is identified as
either static or dynamic, values not affected by the event or values sensitive to the event,

respectively, and then standardized with respect to the baseline measure specified. There
are 115 indicators in total available for the user’s input (Kammouh et al. 2018). Gathering
data from all the variables compiles the degradation of the system over the recovery also
known as the loss of resilience, LOR, measure by using Eq. 1 (Kammouh et al. 2019):
𝑡𝑡1
100 − 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = �
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
(1)
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐
𝑡𝑡0

where 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) is the functionality of the system, 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 is the control time, and 𝑡𝑡0 is the time

at which the event occurs, and 𝑡𝑡1 is the time at which the community’s serviceability
recovers to its original state (without considering the aging effects). The area under the

final serviceability function is the total resilience of the applied community.
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In order to compile an accurate resilience curve for the community, the variables
must be structured appropriately. First, the layered levels of the framework are assigned
importance factors. Importance factors are applied to the dimensions, components, and
indicators to assign superiority within its applied community. The factors range from 1 to
3, with 1 being of least importance (Cimellaro et al. 2016). For example, within the
Physical Infrastructure dimension 23 importance factors are appointed. These factors
assign importance to the variables within each dimension according to resilience. The
higher the importance factor, the higher the importance to the overall system’s resilience.

Figure 2.3 The dimensions, components, indicators, and measures of PEOPLES
Next, in order to assign rank amongst indicators, components, and dimensions, an
interdependency matrix technique is performed producing interdependency factors. The
interdependency factors are used to eliminate irrelevant or overlapping measures. All
corresponding indicators per component are analyzed, all components per dimension are
analyzed, and all seven dimensions are analyzed amongst themselves. The interdependency
matrix technique can be visually explained in Table 2.1. A square matrix is formed for each
level starting from the lowest level, the indicators. The first row and column are the
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indicators above and adjacent to each cell. The values in the matrix are either 0, meaning
the component’s functionality does not depend on the indicator, or 1, meaning the
component’s functionality does depend on the indicator, (Kammouh et al., 2019). The
values are then added vertically, and the sums correspond to the interdependency factors
for each indicator. The same is performed for the components per each dimension and then
finally with all seven dimensions to create the final community resilience index.
Then, the importance factors and interdependency factors are used to create a
weighted factor that is applied to each variable’s functionality function using Eq. 2
(Kammouh et al. 2019)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 =

𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
∑𝑖𝑖=1 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖

(2)

∙ 𝑛𝑛

where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the weighting factor of the 𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ variable, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the importance factor of the 𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ

variable, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is the interdependency factor of the 𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ variable, and 𝑛𝑛 is the number of
variables in the calculated array. For example, when computing the weighting factor for

the lifelines component for the physical infrastructure dimension, n would be 13 for the 13
indicators within that specific component. The revised functionality function becomes Eq.
3 (Kammouh et al. 2019)
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖

(3)

where i indicates which specific variable is used, 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗ is the new functionality function, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
is the weighted factor, and 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 is the original functionality function.

Finally, each indicator, component, and dimension’s functionality function are

aggregated into a single functionality function that embodies the overall resilience
performance of the community after natural disasters as seen in Eq. 4 (Kammouh et al.
2019).
(4)

𝐷𝐷=7

𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the weighting function of the 𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ dimension; and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is the functionality

function of dimension 𝑖𝑖. D equals 7 due to the seven dimensions in PEOPLES.
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Table 2. 1 Interdependency matrix technique
Indicator
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1

0

1
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0
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0
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0

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1
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0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0
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0
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0

1

0

0

0

0

1

2

1

7

1

3

3

2

2
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Community
services
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infrastructure
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Distribution
commercial
facilities
Hotels and
accommodations
Schools
�=

The dimension 𝑖𝑖’s functionality function is computed by Eq. 5 (Kammouh et al., 2019)
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖

(5)

𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡)
𝑗𝑗=1

where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the weighting function of component 𝑗𝑗 under dimension 𝑖𝑖, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the

functionality function of component 𝑗𝑗 under dimension 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is the total number of
components under dimension 𝑖𝑖. The component 𝑖𝑖’s functionality function is computed by
Eq. 6 (Kammouh et al., 2019)
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(6)

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 (𝑡𝑡)
𝑘𝑘=1

where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 is the weighting function of indicator 𝑘𝑘 under component 𝑗𝑗, which belongs to

dimension 𝑖𝑖, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 is the functionality function of indicator 𝑘𝑘 under component 𝑗𝑗, which
belongs to dimension 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of indicators under component 𝑗𝑗, which

belongs to dimension 𝑖𝑖. Using Eq. 4 as reference, the community’s resilience in totality is
expanded into Eq. 7 (Kammouh et al. 2019)
𝑅𝑅 = �

𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐

𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜

𝐷𝐷=7

𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖

𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑗𝑗=1

𝑘𝑘=1

𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = �� 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ �� 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ �� 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 (𝑡𝑡)��� 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(7)

Finally, to achieve the resilience index, each variable’s functionality function

compiles a serviceability curve that is also aggregated and put into one whole serviceability
curve for the community as displayed in Figure 2.4. All seven dimensions of the PEOPLES
framework are measured by their components, the indicators within each component, and
the measures assigned for interpreting each indicator. The seven dimensions of the
PEOPLES framework use specific equations and points of reference for dimensions’
measures.
This indicator-based approach framework was applied to the city of San Francisco after
the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake (Kammouh et al., 2019). The results showed a need for
better resilience in facilities compared to lifelines. The recovery time for residential homes
to return back to their original states was 120 days, approximately. All indicators within
the components were assigned importance factors of 3 except for community services and
economic infrastructure exposure within the facilities component.
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Figure 2.4 The serviceability curves for the community shown through the levels of the variables, dimensions, components, and
indicators

CHAPTER 3. RESILIENCE QUANTIFICATION OF HARLAN COUNTY,
KENTUCKY
3.1 Case Study: Harlan County, Kentucky

Harlan County

Figure 3.1 Map of US Appalachian Region with Harlan County (Source: www.arc.gov)
Within the state of Kentucky, many floods have occurred causing flood resilience
to be extremely prevalent even today. The state of Kentucky has had a total of 79 disaster
declarations (FEMA, 2020), the first being in January 1957 (DR-66) and the most recent
in March 2020 (DR-4497) with the most recent due to severe storms in April 2019 (DR4428). A disaster declaration is an emergency declaration that declares a plea for financial
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and physical aid through FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, funding.
The state has one of the lowest emergency management budgets of $59,070,300 labeling
it as one of the country’s most unprepared states for natural disasters (WKYT, 2018). Rural
Kentucky is at constant battle with landslides, mudslides, rockslides, flooding, tornadoes,
and severe storms including extreme rain and wind problems (Whiteman, 2013). The
FEMA DR-4428 report declared Kentucky in a state of disaster during February 6 to March
10, 2019 for severe storms, straight-line winds, flooding, landslides, and mudslides.
$740,193.88 were allocated from public grants (FEMA DR-4428).
Five significant floods have occurred in the state of Kentucky dating back to 1937,
1945, 1977, 1997, and 2010 (NOAA, 2018). Harlan County, as outlined in Figure 3.1,
experienced one of the worst floods since the 1977 flood in February 2018 (Marie, 2019).
The habitants are still recovering from the June 2018 flood damage and with the added
disaster impact, more roads were left so damaged they were forced to be closed. Water had
crested at 22.6 feet well over the 16 feet flood stage consideration, with precipitation at 5.4
inches from 4:00 am Saturday to Sunday evening (Asher, 2018). Churches, fire stations,
and the courthouse acted as shelter areas for the public. With Harlan County relying heavily
on the agricultural business, this negatively contributed to its declining low economy.
The Harlan County Emergency Management Team performs Damage Assessment
Reports after every natural disaster recording the degree and details of the damage done to
public and residential infrastructure. Damage Assessment Reports from June 2016,
February 2018, and February 2019 flood events were given to the researchers for purposes
of aiding the physical infrastructure input for the PEOPLES framework. The Damage
Assessment Reports are split into several sections depending on if it is public or residential
infrastructure. The public infrastructure forms are composed of 11 sections: location
information and damage, damage values, facility information, detailed damage, insurance
information, contacts, notes, photos, special needs, environmental issues and impacts, and
state/FEMA review. The residential property forms are composed of 10 sections: location
information and damage, damage values and demographics, detailed damage, insurance
information, contacts, notes, photos, special needs, environmental issues and impacts, and
state/FEMA review. For the February 2018 flood, 3 out of the total 25 Damage Assessment
Reports reported back affected, and 12 out of 16 from the February 2019 flood were
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reported back with “major damage.” A sample of representative assessments reports
obtained are in Appendix 1.
In order to validate the proposed methodology for resilience quantification of rural
communities, the HAZUS Flood Model will first be used to apply a scenario flood to
Harlan County, Kentucky. The scenario flood applied will be a 100-year flood based off
the February 2018 flood. Then, estimation losses will be retrieved and used as input into
the PEOPLES framework for the community resilience evaluation. The indicator-oriented
approach methodology is investigated in this research. There is a total of seven dimensions
with a sum of 29 components and 116 indicators. For example, the physical infrastructure
dimension consists of two components, facilities and lifelines. Eight indicators pertain to
the facilities component, and thirteen indicators belong to the lifelines component. The
input measures for each indicator are specified in Table 3.1. Each indicator is described by
a measure and input as a quantitative value.
The input data is obtained by multiple databases, including the US Census Bureau,
ArcGIS, EIA (US Energy Information Administrative), USGS (Unites States Geological
Survey), KYTC (Kentucky Transportation cabinet), City-Data, ARC (Appalachian
Regional Commission), Civic Dashboards by Open Gov, Kentucky Department of Fish
and Wildlife Resources, Kong et al. (2008), Dai et al. (2016), Exumet et al. (2005), USDA
(United States Department of Agriculture), Commonwealth of KY: State Board of
Elections, Tri Cities Heritage Development Corporation, CRE (Community Resource
Exchange), USNRC ( United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, FEMA, National
Park Service, Kentucky Adult Education U-Skills, Kentucky Emergency Management,
EWG (Environmental Working Group), Kentucky Department of Agriculture, KET
(Kentucky Educational Television), National Climate Assessment, and KYDLG
(Kentucky Department for Local Government).
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Table 3.1 Physical Infrastructure dimension measures
4.1 Facilities
Index
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.1.5
4.1.6
4.1.7
4.1.8

4. Physical Infrastructure
Indicator

Sturdier housing types
Temporary housing availability
Housing stock construction
quality
Community Services
Economic infrastructure
exposure
Distribution commercial
facilities
Hotels and accommodations
Schools

4.2 Lifelines
Index
Indicator
4.2.1 Telecommunication
4.2.2
4.2.3
4.2.4

Mental health support
Physician access
Medical care capacity

4.2.5
4.2.6
4.2.7

Evacuation routes
Industrial re-supply potential
High-speed internet
infrastructure
Efficient energy use
Efficient water use
Gas
Access and evacuation
Transportation
Wastewater treatment

4.2.8
4.2.9
4.2.10
4.2.11
4.2.12
4.2.13

Measure

% housing units not manufactured homes
% vacant units that are for rent
100-% housing units built prior to 1970
%Area of community services (recreational facilities parks - historic sites - libraries - museums) total area /SV
% commercial establishments outside of high hazard zones
/total commercial establishment
%Commercial infrastructure area per area /SV
Number of hotels per total area /SV
Schools area (primary and secondary education) per
population /SV

Measure

Average number of Internet - television - radio - telephone
and telecommunications broadcasters per household /SV
Number of beds per 100 000 population /SV
Number of physicians per population /SV
Number of available hospital beds per 100000 population
/SV
Major road egress points per building /SV
Rail miles per total area /SV
% population with access to broadband internet service
Ratio of Megawatt power production to demand
Ratio of water available to water demand
Ratio of gas production to gas demand
Principal arterial miles per total area /SV
Number of rail miles per area /SV
Number of WWT units per population /SV

= Dimension
= Component
= Indicator
= Measure
For example, Table 3.2 shows the input used for the Facilities and Lifelines

components within the Physical Infrastructure dimension. Seven main inputs must be
inserted into the PEOPLES software: w (the weighting factor), Nat (nature, meaning static,
s or dynamic, d, 𝑞𝑞0𝑢𝑢 (serviceability before the event), SV (the standard value/reference

point to which the indicators are measured), 𝑞𝑞1 (the serviceability after the event), 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟 (the
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serviceability after recovery), and 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 (the restoration time in days). 𝑞𝑞1 and 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟 values must
be normalized by the user and divide the quantities over SV.

Table 3.2 Facilities and Lifelines inputs for the Physical Infrastructure dimension
Physical Infrastructure
4.1 Facilities (Importance: 2)
INDEX

INDICATOR

w

Nat

4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3

Sturdier housing types
Temporary housing availability
Housing stock construction
quality
Community Services

0.81
0.41
2.85

d
d
d

0.117
0.245
56.3

1
1
65.8

0.12
0.25
0.86

0.10
0.20
0.78

0.12
0.25
0.86

480
480
480

0.27

d

0.4

1

0.40

0.20

0.40

480

0.81

s

0.85

1

0.85

-

0.85

-

1.22

d

0.176

1

0.18

0.15

0.18

480

4.1.7

Economic infrastructure
exposure
Distribution commercial
facilities
Hotels and accommodations

0.81

d

8

10

0.80

0.40

0.80

720

4.1.8

Schools

0.81

d

18

20

0.90

0.85

0.90

480

1.56

d

0.973

1

0.97

0.49

0.97

480

0.13

s

150

150

1.00

-

1.00

-

0.26

s

50

100

0.50

-

0.50

-

0.59

s

150

150

1.00

-

1.00

-

0.52

s

0.563

1

0.56

-

0.56

-

0.59

d

100

2526

0.04

0.03

0.04

480

d

0.542

1

0.54

0.27

0.54

480

2.15

d

0.733

1

0.73

0.60

0.73

480

1.37

d

0.0014

1

0.00

0.00

0.00

480

4.1.4
4.1.5
4.1.6

𝑞𝑞0𝑢𝑢

SV

𝑞𝑞0

𝑞𝑞1

𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟

𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟

4.2 Lifelines (Importance: 3)
4.2.1

Telecommunication

4.2.2

Mental health support

4.2.3

Physician access

4.2.4

Medical care capacity

4.2.5

Evacuation routes

4.2.6

Industrial re-supply potential

4.2.7
4.2.8

High-speed internet
infrastructure
Efficient energy use

4.2.9

Efficient water use

0.39

4.2.10

Gas

0.98

d

0.264

1

0.26

0.14

0.26

480

4.2.11

Access and evacuation

1.56

d

186

200

0.93

0.75

0.93

480

4.2.12

Transportation

1.76

s

100

2526

0.04

-

0.04

-

4.2.13

Wastewater treatment

1.17

s

4

6

0.67

-

0.67

-
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3.2

The Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard

The Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard, namely HAZUS®-MH (FEMA,2003), was
created by the Department of Homeland Security for the Federal Emergency
Management Agency in the Mitigation Division in Washington, D.C under a contract
with the National Institute of Building Sciences (FEMA, 2003). As a part of the Natural
Hazards Risk Assessment Program, its mission is to provide risk assessment data, tools,
and analyses to support the development of risk communication tools for all phases of
emergency management. HAZUS®-MH utilizes Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
technology to estimate physical, economic, and social impact losses from earthquakes,
floods, and hurricanes. Government planners, GIS specialists, and emergency managers
use HAZUS to define losses and valuable mitigation tactics to take to reduce them.
Microsoft SQL Server is used to organize the extensive amount of data generated for a
given regional loss estimate (FEMA, 2003).
In the HAZUS Flood Model, the study region is evaluated through a county level
region aggregation. Harlan County was selected from downloaded Kentucky state data
updated to RSMeans (construction cost database) 2018 values and reflecting Census 2010
data. A flood hazard generation and flood loss estimation analysis will be performed for
riverine flooding. In order to accurately estimate flood depth, elevation, and velocity,
frequency, discharge, and ground elevation features are used in this process. The Flood
Model uses a dasymetric, a method using areal symbols to spatially classify volumetric
data, version of the Census Block data which attempts to clip out the unpopulated areas
of the Census Block in order to focus on generating an analysis for the built environment
(FEMA, 2003).
An extensive array of databases are used in the HAZUS Flood Model including,
but not limited to, the 2013 National Land Cover Database products by the US Army
Corps of Engineers, the article "Compilation of GIS Data Layers for Flash Flood
Forecasting" published by the Michigan Technological University for the National
Weather Service (2000), the article "Water-Resources Investigations Report 94-4002" for
soil permeability predictability, the National Operational Hydrologic Remote Sensing
Center data, and the NWISWeb Database (FEMA, 2003).
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Analysis of Results
The output from the HAZUS flood scenario performed on Harlan County can be
found in the HAZUS: Flood Global Risk Report Summary in Appendix 2. The
geographical size of the region is approximately 468 square miles and contains 2,421
census blocks. The region contains over 12 thousand households and has a total population
of 29,278 people (2010 Census Bureau data). The distribution of population by State and
County for the study region is provided in Appendix 2 of the HAZUS: Flood Global Risk
Report Summary. There are an estimated 13,557 buildings in the region with a total
building replacement value of $2.17 billion. Approximately 93.37% of the buildings (and
72.23% of the building value) are associated with residential housing.
For essential facilities, there is one hospital in the region with a total bed capacity
of 150 beds. Physician access was assumed to have one physician per three beds, therefore
having a total of 50 physicians. Since there was no impact to the number of hospital beds,
assumptions are made for the same no impact to the number of physician access. There
are 18 schools, 19 fire stations, eight police stations and one emergency operation center.
HAZUS estimates that about 757 buildings will be at least moderately damaged. This is
over 15% of the total number of buildings in the scenario. There are an estimated 565
buildings that will lose complete functionality. On the day of the scenario flood event, the
model estimates that 150 hospital beds are to remain available in the region. The total
economic loss estimated for the flood is $744.64 million.
The building losses are broken into two categories: direct building losses and
business interruption losses. The direct building losses are the estimated costs to repair or
replace the damage caused to the building and its contents. The business interruption losses
are the losses associated with inability to operate a business because of the damage
sustained during the flood. Business interruption losses also include the temporary living
expenses for those people displaced from their homes because of the flood. The total
building-related losses were $469.66 million. This represents 51.35% of the aggregate
replacement value of the scenario buildings. 37% of the estimated losses were related to
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the business interruption of the region. The residential occupancies made up 44.67% of the
total loss.
The following seven dimensions, PEOPLES, 1.) population and demographics, 2.)
environmental and ecosystem, 3.) organized governmental services, 4.) physical
infrastructure, 5.) lifestyle and community competence, 6.) economic development, and 7.)
social and cultural capital, are individually discussed. For every serviceability curve, the
x-axis is recovery time in days, the y-axis is the serviceability percentage measure, and the
area under the curve equates to the resilience index. The average restoration times reported
by HAZUS were for schools, fire station facilities, and police station facilities as 480 days,
693 days, and 727 days as seen in Table A3.1, Table A3.2 and Table A3.3 in the Appendix
3. According to Eq. 1, the maximum restoration time will be used in the loss of resilience
calculations for all dimensions, therefore 727 days. Although the maximum restoration
period must be used for the overall LOR of each dimension, if fire station facilities or
schools pertain to any indicator measures, those restoration periods were used.
4.1.1

P: Population and Demographics

The population and demographics dimension measures the social vulnerability within
the impacted community (Cimellaro et al. 2016). Social vulnerability is the characteristic
that defines the society's ability to prepare for and recover from an unexpected event. In
order to accurately portray the social vulnerability within a community, many indicators
are used. Speciallfically for Harlan County its important to account for a smaller
population, larger percentage population of people over 65 years, and a majorly white
population. Some of the indicators used to measure the social vulnerability are population
density, place attachment, equity, population stability, educational attainment equality, and
homeownership. For example, the eduactional attainment equality indicator in the socioeconomic status components is attained using Eq. 8 (Cimellaro et al. 2016).
% 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛
𝛽𝛽1 =
% 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
where 𝛽𝛽1

(8)

is the educational attainment equality measurement. The population and

demographics dimension consists of three components: (1.) distribution/density, (2.)
composition, and (3.) socio-economic status. Figure 4.1 displays the serviceability curve
for the dimension for Harlan County.
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Figure 4.1 Serviceability of Population and Demographics Dimension
The distribution density, composition, and socioeconomic status components had a
loss of resilience of 27.20%, 30.574%, and 35.82%, respectively. The overall population
and demographic dimension equated to a loss of resilience of 29.872%.

Eq. 9

mathematically interprets the loss of resilience for the population and demographics
dimension.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.& 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷. = �

𝑡𝑡1

𝑡𝑡0

720
(9)
100 − 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)
100 − 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = �
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 29.872%
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐
720
0

The recovery period for the socioeconomic status component displays a sudden

increase at 365 days because the educational attainment equality indicator measurement
was reliant on the schools’ restoration time.
4.1.2

E: Environmental and Ecosystem

The environmental and ecosystem dimension measures the capability of the
community's ecological system to be able to bounce back to its original form after a
disturbance and its degree of absorbance without varying its environmental developments
51

and configurations (Cimellaro et al. 2016). For example, the density of green vegetation
across an area indicator of the biomass (vegetation) component is measured through a
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), an index that defines the green
vegetation density across an area through satellite remote sensing images (Rouse et al.
1973). Eq. 10 shows how the NDVI is computed per Cimellaro et al. (2016) as:
𝛽𝛽2 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

(10)

where 𝛽𝛽2 represents the normalized difference vegetation with NIR expressing the near

infrared absorption bands, and RED as the visible red infrared absorption bands. The NDVI
is used to compare the before and after images following a natural disaster. The
environmental and ecosystem dimension consists of six subcategories: (1.) water, (2.) air,
(3.) soil, (4.) biodiversity, (5.) biomass (vegetation), and (6.) sustainability. Figure 4.2

displays the serviceability curve for the dimension.
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Figure 4.2 Serviceability of Environmental and Ecosystem Dimension
The water, air, soil, biodiversity, biomass (vegetation), and sustainability
components had a loss of resilience of 6.81%, 30.42%, 56.98%, 12.47%, 15.65%, and
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54.96%, respectively. The overall environmental and ecosystem dimension equated to a
loss of resilience of 30.438%. Eq. 11 mathematically interprets the loss of resilience for
the environmental and ecosystem dimension.

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸.&𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸. = �

𝑡𝑡1

𝑡𝑡0

720
(11)
100 − 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)
100 − 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = �
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 30.438%
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐
720
0

The water component saw the fastest recovery because of its priority within a

community. The direct economic losses for utilities was heavily influenced by its impact
on potable water and wastewater as seen in Table A3.5 in the Appendix 3.
4.1.3

O: Organized Governmental Services

The organized governmental services dimension measures the sustainability of the
community’s society before and after an extreme event. Emergency response teams are
taken into account as well as legal and security services, police, fire departments, the
military, and hospital emergency departments within this dimension. For example, in the
executive/administrative component, the emergency response services indicator is
measured by Eq. 12 (Cimellaro et al. 2016):
𝛽𝛽3 =

% 𝜔𝜔
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

(12)

where 𝛽𝛽3 is the emergency response services indicator with % 𝜔𝜔 representing the percent

of firefighting and law enforcement protection, and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 signifying the standard value
acceptable in another community. Mitigation and recovery funding efforts are also

addressed in this dimension. The organized governmental services dimension consists of
five components: (1.) executive/administrative, (2.) judicial, (3.) legal/security, (4.)
mitigation/preparedness, and (5.) recovery/response. Figure 4.3 displays the serviceability
of the dimension with subplots Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7, and Figure
4.8 for each component.
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Figure 4.3 Serviceability of Organized Governmental Services Dimension
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Figure 4.4 Serviceability of executive/administrative component
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Figure 4.5 Serviceability of judicial component
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Figure 4.6 Serviceability of legal/security component
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Figure 4.7 Serviceability of mitigation/preparedness component
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Figure 4.8 Serviceability of recovery/response component
The executive/administrative, judicial, legal/security, mitigation/preparedness, and
recovery/response components had a loss of resilience of 46.50%, 37.51%, 24.33%,
42.03%, and 56.80%, respectively. The overall organized governmental services
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dimension equated to a loss of resilience of 41.423%. Eq. 13 mathematically interprets the
loss of resilience for the organized governmental services dimension.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔.𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = �
= 41.423%

𝑡𝑡1

𝑡𝑡0

(13)
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐
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The subplots of the dimension demonstrate the large increase in the
executive/administrative component, but declining efforts in the mitigation/preparedness
component. Not enough funding options for mitigation efforts are given to the community,
therefore, even before the impact strikes, the community is already suffering. Specifically,
for Harlan County, the advancement in optimizing the damage assessment reports after a
flood have made little progress. Recovery measures are still strongly needed. Through the
unity of both components, the organized governmental services dimension could reduce its
loss of resilience. Recovery/response in Figure 4.8 is shown as constant since, without the
proper mitigation strategies set in place, recovery rates will remain the same. The
recovery/response

and

legal/security

components

are

heavily

reliant

on

the

mitigation/preparedness component.
4.1.4

P: Physical Infrastructure

The physical infrastructure dimension measures stability and resilience of facilities and
lifelines within a built environment (Cimellaro et al. 2016). Serviceable schools, consistent
transportation, and operable power and gas networks are evaluated in this dimension. For
example, the high-speed internet infrastructure indicator in the lifelines component can be
evaluated through Eq. 14 (Cimellaro et al. 2016) represented by 𝛽𝛽4 .
𝛽𝛽4 = 𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃ℎ (𝑡𝑡) =

∑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡0𝐸𝐸 𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)

(14)

𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇

where 𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) represents the number of households without service at a given time, 𝑡𝑡,

from the time the impactful event struck, 𝑡𝑡0𝐸𝐸 , and 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 represents the total number of
households with service before the emergency. The physical infrastructure dimension also

relies heavily on the interdependencies between the different types of lifelines, e.g. water,
wastewater, telecommunication, and electrical lines. The functionality of the community
in totality is extremely weighed on this dimension due to these vital linkages. The physical
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infrastructure dimension consists of two subcategories: (1.) facilities, and (2.) lifelines.
Figure 4.9 displays the serviceability curve for the dimension.
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Figure 4. 9 Serviceability of Physical Infrastructure Dimension
The loss of resilience, using Eq. 1, of facilities was 42.38%, the loss of resilience
of lifelines was 52.20%, and the loss of resilience of the entire dimension was 48.359%.
Eq. 15 mathematically interprets the loss of resilience for the physical infrastructure
dimension.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠.

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟.

𝑡𝑡1

720
100 − 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)
100 − 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)
=�
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = �
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 48.359%
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐
720
𝑡𝑡0
0

(15)

The lifelines component’s loss of resilience is the deciding factor in fund allocation

for the community within the dimension. The medical care capacity indicator was not
affected by the flood, but the transportation indicator measure performed poorly.
4.1.5

L: Lifestyle and Community Competence

The lifestyle and community competence dimension measures the raw abilities and
perceptions of the community (Cimellaro et al. 2016). This dimension measures the degree
of mental competence a community has in problem solving through creativity and
flexibility. Political partnerships are also evaluated in this sector. The community’s
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competence can be measured through life survey questions such as the number of citizens
involved in organizational disaster training programs, the number of immigrants, or the
number of citizens involved in politics. The lifestyle and community competence
dimension includes three components: (1.) collective actions and decision making, (2.)
collective efficacy and empowerment, and (3.) quality of life. For example, a Eq. 16
(Cimellaro et al. 2016) explains the quality of life component through the means of
transport, safety, quality of homes, and quality of neighborhood indicators.
(16)

𝛽𝛽5 = 𝜀𝜀1…𝑖𝑖5

where 𝛽𝛽5 represents the quality of life component measures based on the indicator

measures of household percentage with a minimum of one car, crime rate, and
sustainability ratings for homes and neighborhoods. 𝜀𝜀 embodies the indicator within the 5th

dimension, lifestyle and community competence, with the 1 to 𝑖𝑖 subscript representing the

different indicators pertaining to that dimension. Figure 4.10 displays the serviceability
curve for the dimension.
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Figure 4. 10 Serviceability of Lifestyle and Community Competence Dimension
The collective action and decision making, collective efficacy and empowerment,
and quality of life components had a loss of resilience of 0%, 59.14%, and 37.85%,
59

respectively. The overall lifestyle and community competence dimension equated to a loss
of resilience of 36.162%. Eq. 17 mathematically interprets the loss of resilience for the
lifestyle and community competence dimension.
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(17)

The 0% LOR for the collective action and decision-making component means that

this component was not affected, therefore, generating an 100% serviceability over time,
as seen in Figure 4.10. The component has only one indicator, authorities interdependency,
and the measure states that if there are less than three parties involved in the decisionmaking process then there will be no loss of resilience, but if there is more, then it would
be excluded from the dimension loss of resilience quantification. Harlan County is a small
rural community that has less than three parties involved. The more parties involved in
decision-making, the more time it will take to reach a decision in the event of a flood. The
fewer number of parties needing to be in agreement will enable decisions to be made easier
and plans to be implemented quicker.
4.1.6

E: Economic Development

The economic development dimension measures the community’s aptitude of
replacing resources, services, and shift employment patterns when struck by an unexpected
event through a static and dynamic assessment (Cimellaro et al., 2016). The static
assessment evaluates the current economic activity within the community, while the
dynamic assessment gauges the community’s competence in maintaining the economic
growth. For example, Eq. 18 (Cimellaro et al., 2016) calculates the economic diversity
indicator within the industry-employment services component
𝛽𝛽6 =

% 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

(18)

with 𝛽𝛽6 representing the economic diversity indicator. The economic development

dimension consists of three components: (1.) financial services, (2.) industry-employment
services, and (3.) industry-production. Figure 4.11 displays the serviceability curve for the
dimension.
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Figure 4. 11 Serviceability of Economic Development Dimension
The financial services, industry employment services, and industry-production
components had a loss of resilience of 53.30%, 47.17%, and 68.97%, respectively. The
overall economic development dimension equated to a loss of resilience of 59.917%.
Figure 4.11 displays the serviceability curve for the dimension. Eq. 19 mathematically
interprets the loss of resilience for the economic development dimension.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷.
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(19)

The serviceability of the economic development dimension is crippled once the

flood passes. Most often, after the flood event occurred, the components of other
dimensions would return back to their original serviceability states, but it is different for
the economic development case. Economic stability is shaken, therefore inhibiting the
possibility of economic growth. Economic stability will eventually return back to its
original state, but the economic growth will take an extensive amount of time. The
industry-production component includes two notable drops in its serviceability plot
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signifying the economic loss when first affected by the flood and the economic decline
after the flood.
4.1.7

S: Social-Cultural Capital

The social and cultural capital dimension is a measure of the community’s social
connectivity (Cimellaro et al. 2016). This is measured through the number of citizens who
participate in civic, religious, and political partaking, the amount of community
engagement, and the residents’ immersion in social groups. The social and cultural capital
dimension consists of seven components: (1.) child and elderly services, (2.) commercial
centers, (3.) community participation, (4.) cultural and heritage services, (5.) education
services/disaster awareness, (6.) non-profit organization, and (7.) place attachment. Eq. 20
(Cimellaro et al. 2016), represented by 𝛽𝛽7, characterizes the dimension’s multiple indicator
measures based on number of cultural resources, population percentage of people under 65
years old, and number of Red Cross volunteers per 10,000 persons.
𝛽𝛽7 = 𝜀𝜀17…𝑖𝑖7

(20)

where 𝜀𝜀 embodies the indicator within the 7th dimension, social and cultural capital, with

1 to 𝑖𝑖 subscript representing the different indicators pertaining to that dimension. Figure
4.12 displays the serviceability curve for the dimension.

The child and elderly services, commercial centers, community participation,

cultural and heritage services, education services/disaster awareness, non-profit, and place
attachment components had a loss of resilience of 0%, 76.04%, 20.56%, 51.32%, 42.42%,
43.89%, and 52.14%, respectively. The overall social-cultural capital dimension equated
to a loss of resilience of 34.326%. Eq. 21 mathematically interprets the loss of resilience
for the social-cultural capital dimension.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆.𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. = �
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The 0% LOR for the child and elderly services components signifies that the component
has an 100% serviceability over time, as seen in Figure 4.12. There is only one indicator
for the component, child and elderly care programs. If the community has at least one
program, then there is no loss of resilience, if not, it is excluded from the dimension’s loss
of resilience quantification.
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Figure 4. 12 Serviceability of Social-Cultural Capital Dimension
Harlan County has a total of 227 people in nursing facilities/skilled-nursing
facilities according to 2010 data (city-data).
4.2 The Community Resilience Curve
The loss of resilience of the entire community including all seven dimensions
equated to 37.395%. The economic development dimension was the dimension most
affected by the flood impact. The loss of resilience was the highest with the physical
infrastructure and organized governmental services following after with more than a 40%
loss of resilience. Figure 4.13 displays the serviceability of the total community. All seven
dimensions were aggregated to create a single community total serviceability curve.
The least affected dimension was the population and demographics dimension at
29.872% and the environmental and ecosystem dimension close at 30.438%. It can be
inferred that due to a small population, the social vulnerability is less affected, therefore
not impacting the population and demographics dimension as severely. The environmental
and ecosystem’s resistance exhibits the environment’s adaptability.
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Figure 4. 13 Serviceability of the Community in Harlan County, KY
This adaptability can also be understood as the ecosystem and environment’s forfeit to
flood events. Harlan County has been exposed to flooding for many years and for that
reason, the environment has unfortunately changed significantly compared to how it used
to be.
The lifestyle and community competence dimension reveal the people’s
commitment to their community and their willingness to keep the community running,
before or after the flood event (Cimellaro et al. 2016). The social-cultural capital dimension
offers a similar approach, but on a more individualistic standpoint. Harlan County has a
total of 54 abandoned/occupied coal camps (Appalachian Center & Appalachian Studies
Program). The towns in which these camps were instituted into, in the early twentieth
century, were considered coal towns where the extraction of coal shaped the social and
economic life of the residents at the time (Appalachian Center & Appalachian Studies
Program). These coal towns brought in multicultural and multilingual communities that
still come together today for reunions in honor of their descendants. Place attachment is
the driving factor. Regardless of the catastrophic events that occur, the social capital
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remains. These dimensions were in range of the overall loss of resilience of the community.
Eq. 22 mathematically interprets the loss of resilience for the community in total.
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(22)

The lifestyle and community competence dimension was 1.2% away, and the

social-cultural capital dimension had a 3.09% difference.
4.3 Kentucky State Budget Allocation
By using this pre-decision disaster resilience framework, time and money can be
spared for rural communities similar to Harlan County. Local emergency management
teams can prepare more effective disaster preparation plans, and politicians can prioritize
the allocation of funds to certain facilities and lifelines prior to the catastrophe.
Based on the PEOPLES results, the research advises Harlan County local officials to
allocate additional funds to economic development, physical infrastructure, and organized
governmental

services.

The

indicators

within

the

lifelines

component

are

telecommunication, mental health support, physician access, medical care capacity,
evacuation routes, industrial re-supply potential, high-speed internet infrastructure,
efficient energy use, efficient water use, gas, access and evacuation, transportation, and
wastewater treatment. Results showed 32.4% damage of the wastewater facilities and 40%
of the potable water systems with $13,054,000 worth in damage.
The Kentucky State Budget runs on a biennial budget cycle with the fiscal year starting
July 1st. The state budget is split into several categories, but the main categories within
Kentucky are pensions, health care, education, defense, welfare, protection, transportation,
general government, and other spending. Figure 4.14 demonstrates the funding allocation
through a pie chart for the 2020 fiscal year. Compared to the 2018 State budget
(Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2018), there was a 5.4% increase in healthcare funding,
4.7% increase in funding for education, and an 11% decrease in transportation funding.
Television – Public Safety Emergency Warning and Alert Capacity to ensure
critical localized weather alerts for improvement in safety and preparedness around the
state (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2020).
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Figure 4. 14 Kentucky State Budget for the 2020 fiscal year
(Source: usgovernmentspending.com Last accessed: April 2020)
For the 2020-2022 cycle, $1,000,000,000 was allocated for the Kentucky Education
Emergency warning is the first step but without enough funds for transportation, evacuation
and recovery processes are compromised. Within the physical infrastructure dimension, it
is suggested that the authorities should focus more on enhancing lifelines as the obtained
benefits would be greater. When more money is put apart for transportation, which falls
under the lifelines category, the loss of resilience for lifelines decreases to 31.6%, allowing
a more resilient Harlan County. The overall physical infrastructure loss of resilience
decreases to 33%. This is due to the dependability of the measurements for access and
evacuation, industrial re-supply potential, and transportation on road and rail miles. Eq. 23
shows the new serviceability curve for the physical infrastructure dimension.
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Within the economic development dimension, it is suggested that the authorities
should focus more on enhancing industry-production as the obtained benefits would be
greater. When more money is put apart for manufacturing, agriculture, and the
development of more businesses, the overall economic development loss of resilience
decreases to 37.68%, allowing a more resilient Harlan County.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
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Within the organized governmental services dimension, it is suggested that the

authorities should focus more on enhancing recovery/response as the obtained benefits
would be greater. When more money is put apart for other services including disaster risk
reduction measures integrated into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation activities, local
contingency plan degree including an outline strategy for post-disaster recovery and
reconstruction, and ecosystem support plans, the overall organized governmental services
loss of resilience decreases to 30.38%, allowing a more resilient Harlan County.
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(25)

By adjusting these changes to each component within each of these three

dimensions, the overall loss of resilience of the community reduces to 31.88%, roughly by
a 5% difference.
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By strengthening and enhancing a system’s resilience though the proper risk

reduction measures, a community can accrue a substantial amount of savings. The
proposed modified PEOPLES framework allows a useful quantifiable assessment of a rural
community’s vulnerabilities. Through this assessment, prioritization is applied to areas of
the community that would most benefit from it. A holistic approach includes all
characteristics of a community, which can help distinguish the vital relationship of
dependability to consider. By doing so, local government officials in the community can
take the proper steps in applying this information to mitigation, recovery, and response
plans.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
5.1 Summary of Conclusions
Community resilience is still under investigation in finding the best solution for a
community to achieve it. A renowned resilience framework, namely PEOPLES, was
investigated to quantify and evaluate the measurement of the overall community resilience
of Harlan County, KY, part of Rural Appalachia. To gather data that can be used as input,
a scenario flood was applied to Harlan County through the flood model of FEMA HAZUSMH (FEMA, 2003). The flood was set in February, reflecting the February 2018 flood that
caused immense damage to the county two years before.
This approach evaluates the scenario hazard on the community through a layered
framework based off the dimensions: population and demographics, environmental and
ecosystem, organized governmental services, physical infrastructure, lifestyle and
community competence, economic development, and social and cultural capital. Within
each of the seven dimensions, lies multiple components with a characteristic associated
with the theme of the specified dimension, and within each component lies various
indicators which take the qualitative measures and interpret them as quantitative measures.
Weighting factors are assigned to each variable. After applying a modified PEOPLES
resilience framework to Harlan County, KY, the level of resilience and serviceability
curves were computed for each component, dimension, and the overall community.
The loss of resilience of the entire community including all seven dimensions
equated to 36.85%. The economic development dimension was the dimension most
affected by the flood impact. The loss of resilience was the highest with the physical
infrastructure and organized governmental services following after with more than a 40%
loss of resilience. It is suggested that the authorities should focus more on economic
development, the physical infrastructure, and organized governmental services as the
obtained benefits would be greater. By applying such modifications, the overall loss of
resilience can decrease to 31.88%. The results show the validity of the proposed approach
as a decision-support mechanism to assess and enhance the resilience of rural communities.
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5.2 Recommendations for Further Research
When distinguishing rural communities versus urban communities, a prioritization
to urban areas during a state of emergency is more prevalent than in rural areas. Between
the years 2010 and 2016, a tremendous drop in rural population has occurred along with
higher poverty and unemployment rates (USDA, 2017). By applying and investigating the
resilience of rural Appalachia, this can open a door to international goals for evaluating
resilience elsewhere. This layered resilience framework can be applied to more
geographical regions of larger or smaller sizes impacted by other natural hazards such as
flood, tornado, hurricane, and/or earthquake. Understanding the losses of one natural
disaster can support decisions toward better preparedness and mitigation plans. A closer
step towards flood resilience benefits the resilience research community to continue its
investigations in finding new ways to build stronger infrastructure, urging to maintain rural
facilities and lifelines, and incorporating interdependencies within the community for a
well-rounded solution.
Another potential research direction can be by the modeling of decision-making in
rural communities in terms of the adoption of technology considering the exogeneous and
endogenous factors (Nejat, 2012). The synergy of cyber technology and physical
infrastructure has allowed advancement in the various fields of political science,
economics, management science, and engineering. Planned collaborations among multiple
decision makers, diverse ranks of government, private entities, and nonproﬁt
establishments are needed for disaster management therefore making game theory
appropriate to study (Seaberg et al., 2017). It has been used in the application of natural
disasters through many strategies. When determining the proper steps to take in the
response phase of disaster management, methods such as the stochastic ﬁctitious play
model, Smyrnakis and Leslie (2010), proposed can make a difference. Coles and Zhuang
(2011) introduced a method to provide and aid decision makers in emergency surroundings
on how to choose and sustain relationships to advance resource utilization in a disaster.,
and Nagurney et al. (2019) introduced an integrated financial and logistical game theory
model for humanitarian organizations or non-governmental organizations.
Future research directions in preexisting methodologies studying community
resilience could try implementing computational models, particularly multiagent systems69

based ones, and work in game theory, agent-based modeling, and system dynamics for the
community resilience analysis applications. Future game-theory implementations can be
explored such as using a goal-based, utility-based, or learning agent instead of the BDI
agent to the community resilience frameworks as introduced in Chapter 1.
Further research is recommended to improve resilience frameworks and suggest the
following future directions:


Comparisons between other game theory applications integrated to community
resilience frameworks



The study of poverty models for dictating the degree of resiliency within a
community to assign discrete measures appropriately to the community under
evaluation



Incorporating endogenous or direct attributes to an agent in agent-based models
(i.e. age, health and socioeconomic status) (Nejat, 2012)



Incorporating exogenous or indirect attributes to an agent in agent-based models
(i.e. signals from policy makers for community commitment, or climate change)
(Nejat, 2012)



Investigating robustness of advanced mitigation strategies into community
resilience (Javadinasab Hormozabad and Zahrai, 2019; Palacio Betancur and
Gutierrez Soto, 2019).
As a result, the resilience framework could enable faster disaster planning for

communities after a natural disaster making multiagent systems transform the
understanding on individual and systems’ decisions affecting community resilience
subjected to multiple hazard events.
Another potential future research direction is incorporating the results from
structural extreme event reconnaissance network on different hazard events such as the
Nashville Tornadoes (Wood et al. 2020), the Hurricanes Michael (Alipour et al. 2018) and
Dorian (Kijewski-Correa et al. 2019) and the Palu Earthquake and Tsunami (Robertson
and Kijewski-Correa, 2020).
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. Harlan County Damage Assessment Reports
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APPENDIX 2. HAZUS: Flood Global Risk Report
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APPENDIX 3. HAZUS Data Tables
Table A3. 1 School Damage Functionality

Table A3. 2 Fire Station Facilities Damage and Functionality

Table A3. 3 Police Station Facilities Damage and Functionality
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Table A3. 4 Transportation System Dollar Exposure

Table A3. 5 Direct Economic Losses for Utilities
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